Alireza Samoudi, Faculty Member, Abrar-e Moaser Research Institute

Introduction

In recent years, the remarkable growth of China’s economic, technological, and military power has generated extensive debate about the country’s position in the international order. On the one hand, Beijing presents itself as a “reformer from within the system,” while on the other hand, the United States and its allies express concern over the emergence of a Chinese order that would stand in opposition to Western liberal values. With the rapid expansion of China’s global influence, the key question arises: Does Beijing intend to challenge and replace the Western-centered liberal order, or does it seek to integrate into it and pursue its interests from within?

In response to this question, three main viewpoints exist.
The first argues that China needs to remain within the framework of the international order to safeguard its interests rather than destroy it, although it seeks to reform it.
The second considers the promises of Chinese leaders unreliable and believes that Beijing, relying on its domestic capabilities and international coalition-building, aims for a fundamental transformation of global order patterns. According to this view, China’s interests directly conflict with those of the United States, and the two countries will ultimately compete and confront each other over leadership of the international order.
The third perspective emphasizes power logic and argues that China has not yet reached a level where it can openly challenge the United States. Supporters of this approach within China believe that premature confrontation with Washington would entail heavy costs, and only when China accumulates sufficient power will it be able to establish a new order in which global leadership shifts from the U.S. to Beijing.

After reviewing China’s approach to international organizations and institutions, this paper examines China’s stance toward the existing order and the initiatives it pursues to achieve its preferred global order.

 

China and International Institutions

One of the earliest indicators of China’s behavior toward the postwar order is the extent of its participation in the major international organizations and institutions that define this order. In the 1960s, China was still considered a revolutionary state seeking to weaken and overthrow the U.S.-led global capitalist order. During the Cold War, China viewed itself as a representative of the developing world and supported the Non-Aligned Movement. When the People’s Republic of China first entered the international system, few expected that a country with China’s particular characteristics could fully integrate into established global rules. China was the world’s most populous country and, under Communist Party rule, differed significantly from Western democracies.

China also possessed a long history and deep cultural differences from the “West,” along with historical resentment stemming from the “Century of Humiliation.” Nevertheless, China has benefited greatly from the existing international order, continues to do so, and wishes to preserve significant parts of it—while clearly seeking fundamental changes as well. China now sees itself as a leader of globalization and a supporter of multilateral order, although this position may change in the future. Overall, China’s interaction with the postwar order has followed a positive trajectory, which is evident in its extensive participation in both formal and informal institutions of the existing order.

In fact, China, which once had limited participation in international regimes, has now reached a stage where it plays an active role in nearly all of them. These include the United Nations, World Trade Organization, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, G20, International Labour Organization, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), International Atomic Energy Agency, conventions on biological and chemical weapons, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Conference on Disarmament, the Montreal Protocol, the Paris Agreement on climate change, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

However, China’s participation is not comprehensive and without exception. For example, China has not yet joined the Rome Statute or the Convention on the Prohibition of Landmines. Some analysts argue that China’s main challenge to the current international order lies not in its overt presence, but in its gradual and hidden efforts to expand its influence within this order—an ongoing process that could ultimately transform the nature of the existing system. In this context, the establishment of alternative institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank represents Beijing’s attempt to increase its bargaining power and influence in institutions like the World Bank and the IMF.

Chinese leaders hold critical views toward certain norms institutionalized in Western liberal-democratic systems, especially when those norms conflict with traditional Westphalian principles of national sovereignty. President Xi Jinping’s desire to reshape global relations and structures is clear and undeniable. Xi seeks to dismantle U.S.-led alliance networks and reduce Western values’ influence over international institutions.

Beijing aims to weaken the role of the dollar and reduce Washington’s dominance over key global technologies. Within Xi’s envisioned multipolar order, international institutions and rules should be based on indigenous Chinese concepts such as “common security,” “economic development,” “Chinese values,” and “Made in China technologies.” The idea of building “a community with a shared future for mankind,” proposed by Beijing, has moved beyond a domestic political slogan and has gradually evolved into a form of international consensus.

 

China’s Four Initiatives and Its Preferred Order

In recent years, China has proposed initiatives such as the “Global Security Initiative,” “Global Development Initiative,” “Global Civilization Initiative,” and “Global Governance Initiative” in an effort to outline its preferred order. Beijing presents these “global initiatives” as public goods aimed at gradually replacing the U.S.-led rules-based order.

For example, the Global Security Initiative was introduced amid the Ukraine war and, while outwardly grounded in the principles of the UN Charter, in practice emphasized absolute state sovereignty. In reality, it prioritizes regime stability and seeks to expand China’s role in resolving global conflicts and tensions.

The Global Development Initiative, launched in 2021 as a complement to the Global Security Initiative, is essentially an effort to securitize the discourse of global development and place it under China’s leadership framework. The third initiative, the Global Civilization Initiative, announced in March 2023, aims primarily to promote the value system of the Chinese Communist Party. The ultimate objective of this approach is to steer the international system toward a model favored by non-Western and emerging states—one they view as a better alternative to the U.S.-centered order, which appears increasingly unstable.

In early September 2025, at the 25th Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Tianjin, President Xi Jinping introduced the Global Governance Initiative as China’s solution to what he called the “three deficits” in current international institutions: insufficient representation of the Global South; declining authority of UN institutions, especially the Security Council; and the urgent need to improve the effectiveness of multilateral initiatives. The official concept note of this initiative highlights global challenges such as climate change and the digital divide as requiring immediate attention. While reaffirming commitment to the UN Charter and the overarching goal of reforming global governance architecture, China also outlined the core principles of its initiative, all of which are defined in close coordination with the UN framework.

Together, China’s four initiatives form the main components of Beijing’s plan to establish an alternative international system. From China’s perspective, the current global order is overly dominated by Western countries, which use it to preserve their hegemonic position. China views reforming this order—and in some cases dismantling or replacing parts of it—as necessary to reduce Western influence and align global governance with China’s national interests, ultimately paving the way for a greater global role for China.

 

Conclusion

China, especially after the 2007 financial crisis, has managed to regain much of its global influence. Beijing has taken steady steps toward fulfilling its long-held ambition of returning to the status of a major global power. China has particularly strengthened its position in global governance. On the one hand, it has gained greater influence and a larger share in major international organizations; on the other hand, it has proposed various initiatives. Increased Chinese participation in global governance structures has enhanced its international political power, expanded its soft power, and simultaneously supported domestic economic growth.

Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, China is seeking to reform global governance. Through the Belt and Road Initiative, membership in BRICS, and the establishment of new institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Beijing is challenging the Western-centered liberal international order represented by the G7 and other international institutions. In the future envisioned by the four initiatives—Global Security, Global Development, Global Civilization, and Global Governance—China will stand at the center of international transformations.

Beijing now believes it is at the best stage of development in its modern history, and that the geo-economic center of the world has shifted from the North Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific. Chinese scholars, experts, and officials argue that the East is rising, the West is declining, and time is on China’s side. China’s political elite believe that by 2049, the centenary of the founding of the People’s Republic, a modern, strong, prosperous, and rejuvenated socialist state will be achieved, matching or surpassing the United States in all components of national power.

From the perspective of China’s leaders, the four initiatives are innovative and highly necessary concepts and appropriate solutions for addressing global problems. Finally, it must be noted that China has benefited from the post–World War II international order, which created an international economic framework from which Beijing gained greatly. Some argue that China wants to overturn the game table. However, it appears that China does not seek to overturn the table on which it has been playing, but rather to slightly adjust it in its favor—and in the short term, it does not intend to replace the existing order entirely.