The 12-day war demonstrated Iran’s need for collaborations that would provide more enduring support during crises. During the war, despite existing cooperation between the two countries, Russia effectively adopted a neutral stance against Iran’s primary threat, which ultimately benefited Israel. Furthermore, competition between Iran and Russia in the energy sector and the absence of a complementary role in the global value chain have hindered the two countries from becoming genuine strategic partners. In this context, China is considered Iran’s only reliable strategic partner. Iran and China have complementary structural and economic relations: Iran supplies energy, while China acts as a buyer and infrastructure investor. <\/p>\n
The two main areas for cooperation are:<\/p>\n
Iran must emphasize completing the missing links in its domestic railway network to make corridor routes economically and logistically viable. Furthermore, these collaborations should send a clear message to the world: Iran has not been weakened after the war; instead, it is moving towards development and international partnerships<\/strong>.<\/strong> <\/p>\n Ultimately, deepening relations with China and activating the Southern Corridor can be a crucial tool for managing relationships with other actors. By demonstrating strength and offering alternative options, Iran can encourage its partners to increase cooperation without damaging existing ties. <\/p>\n Relations between Iran and Russia have always experienced fluctuations. A misunderstanding of Iran-Russia interactions domestically also led to questions about the level of cooperation with Russia after the war. Conversely, some in Russia believe that Iran has been damaged and weakened by the conflict. In a country like Russia, where relations are based on the logic of power, cooperation with a nation whose power has diminished or is diminishing will be re-evaluated based on new dynamics. <\/p>\n Russia viewed reformists as pro-Western and traditionally had no alignment with Iran’s reformist faction. Consequently, it focused on cooperating with conservatives. These collaborations in various financial, banking, and commercial sectors reached their peak during the 13th government. However, after the 12-day war, when Russia failed to provide effective support to Iran, Iran realized it could not rely on Russia’s assistance in its conflict with its primary adversary, as Russia’s neutrality would strategically benefit Israel. Russia is concerned that conservatives might also become disillusioned and turn to its other Eastern partner, China. <\/p>\n In the economic sphere, Iran and Russia are more market competitors than complementary partners. Russia, an energy exporter, welcomes Iran’s absence or limited presence in the oil and gas market. Furthermore, there are no extensive industrial capacities for economic cooperation between Iran and Russia, as the two countries do not play complementary roles in value chains; instead, they often occupy parallel positions. When two countries are rivals in the value chain, limited economic cooperation cannot transform them into strategic partners with long-term interests. <\/p>\n Under these circumstances, it appears Iran will once again pivot towards China \u2013 its sole strategic option for cooperation \u2013 and seek to strengthen its ties with that nation. Cooperation with China offers several fundamental advantages for Iran. Firstly, Iran and China play complementary roles in the global value chain and are structurally well-aligned. In the energy sector, Iran is an energy supplier for China, and China is a reliable buyer for Iran. In this cycle, by selling energy to China, Iran acquires the necessary foreign currency to purchase equipment and infrastructure goods. Conversely, if Iran loses the ability to sell oil to China, it will be unable to secure a significant portion of the foreign exchange required for trade with China. <\/p>\n One significant potential that can deepen cooperation between the two countries is the effort to establish the Southern Belt corridor through Iran. The East-West route of the Belt and Road Initiative comprises three corridors: Northern (via Russia), Middle (via Central Asia and the Caspian Sea), and Southern (via Iran). Following the 12-day war, the US perceived Iran as weakened and, consequently, implemented the Zangezur Corridor, dubbed the ‘Trump Corridor.’ Meanwhile, India, which has managed the Chabahar project for years, has stalled its development due to its delays. In this context, accelerating the Southern Corridor’s completion will integrate Iran into China’s transit framework and facilitate further investment from China. <\/p>\n Considering the developments after the 12-day war and their impact on Iran’s relations with countries such as India and Russia, Iran can present two operational proposals to China:<\/p>\n 1) Activating the Southern Corridor route from Central Asia to Iran, and through Iran to the Sea of Oman and Turkey.<\/p>\n 2) Proposing cooperation to China in developing the northern coasts of the Persian Gulf.<\/p>\n The reason these two proposals should be presented simultaneously is that the relative advantage of corridor routes leading to Iran lies in their access to open waters. Furthermore, a significant part of Iran’s limited participation in corridor routes stems from internal inaction. Iran’s domestic railway network remains fragmented. There are several lines in Iran that need to be interconnected. Connecting these networks is not related to international relations but primarily requires domestic resolve. Iran must prioritize the operationalization of two projects. The first is the Tehran, Qom, Isfahan, and Shiraz high-speed railway, which has the potential to extend to the Persian Gulf coasts in subsequent phases. The infrastructure for this project is already in place and requires Chinese financing for track laying and station construction along the route. Operationalizing this line will not only significantly improve passenger transportation within the country and bring development to its southern regions but also expand the nation’s cargo transport capacity and strengthen its railway network. <\/p>\n Another important issue is the transfer of a portion of the Sea of Oman or Persian Gulf coastline to China. In elite circles, the idea is sometimes floated that Iran should transfer Chabahar Port from India to China. This action is not strategic from various perspectives. Iran possesses an extensive coastline and does not face a land shortage that would necessitate taking Chabahar from India and giving it to China. The slow pace of Chabahar’s development, contrary to expectations, has multiple other reasons, and removing India from this project is not the solution. We must remember that India and Russia are the origin and destination of Iran’s South-North route, and strategically, excluding India is unacceptable. Furthermore, Shahid Rajaee Port and other locations along Iran’s southern coasts offer untapped development potential, where China could be invited to establish a presence. China is aware that the Zangezur Corridor (Middle Corridor) is a route that will ultimately fall under the control of the US and its Western allies. Similarly, with the outbreak of the Ukraine war and the crisis in relations between Russia and Europe, the Northern Corridor route through Russia was effectively severed, preventing its continuation to Western Europe. The existence of a parallel land route connecting East to West while simultaneously providing North-South access is a significant development that could be attractive to the Chinese side. <\/p>\n Focus on the missing links of the corridor<\/strong><\/p>\n A significant part of Iran’s corridor challenge stems from missing links that have fragmented its corridor network and undermined the economic viability of these routes. Iran must convince the Chinese side that the Iranian corridor route is the safest, fastest, and most cost-effective path for North-South and East-West transit. We should not expect others to build corridor routes for us from scratch. Instead, we must design the initial concept, begin its implementation, and then invite others to participate. The complete integration of the national railway network is a domestic issue, and its initial steps must be taken within the country. <\/p>\n Send a message of strength to the world after the war<\/strong><\/p>\n In the current international climate, Iran needs to take actions that demonstrate its position is not merely about survival, but rather a move towards national development. This message can be conveyed through operational initiatives and the implementation of collaborative projects. An announcement that China will cooperate with Iran on the Southern Corridor route and initiate new investments in Iran’s rail and port sectors would send a significant message to other parties. Iran must demonstrate that it is part of an international cooperation program with China, thereby sending a message of strength to both the West and Russia, and preventing other parties from perceiving Iran as weakened after the war. <\/p>\n Utilize the potential of corridors and China to manage Russia<\/strong><\/p>\n Due to its non-complementary economy with Iran, Russia exercises maximum caution in some of its strategic cooperations with Iran. Russia’s approach to strategic cooperation with other countries resembles its relationship with Belarus, meaning cooperation based on acknowledging Russia’s superiority. If Iran practically demonstrates that the more cautious Russia acts, the more Iran will turn to its other partners, this will encourage Russia to show greater eagerness for cooperation with Iran. It has been stated that the Russian logic is power. Developing corridor relations with China sends a message of strength to Russia. Of course, we should never harm our relations with Russia, but to engage with Russia, we need more leverage, and corridor cooperation with China can serve this purpose. <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" The 12-day war demonstrated Iran’s need for collaborations that would provide more enduring support during crises. During the war, despite existing cooperation between the two countries, Russia effectively adopted a neutral stance against Iran’s primary threat, which ultimately benefited Israel. Furthermore, competition between Iran and Russia in the energy sector and the absence of a […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":5,"featured_media":254,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[53,69],"tags":[],"coauthors":[41],"class_list":["post-1842","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-notes-en","category-young-researchers"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1842","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/5"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1842"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1842\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2242,"href":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1842\/revisions\/2242"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/254"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1842"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1842"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1842"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/coauthors?post=1842"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}Proposals<\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n