Seyed Reza Hashemi Jebeli, China Studies Researcher and PhD Student of International Relations<\/p>\n
Great power competition in the twenty-first century is no longer defined solely through classical indicators such as gross domestic product, conventional military capabilities, or even superiority in isolated technologies. Instead, this competition increasingly revolves around control over infrastructural, institutional, and technological domains that shape the frameworks of the future global order\u2014what may be referred to as the \u201cnew frontiers of power.\u201d In this context, the People\u2019s Republic of China has, over the past two decades, pursued a gradual, multilayered, and long-term strategy aimed not merely at increasing national power, but at creating structural levers for the sustained exercise of influence within the international system. This article argues that China\u2019s leverage-building is not the outcome of short-term reactive measures, but rather the product of an accumulative and structural strategy designed to shape the rules of the game prior to the consolidation of a future order. It seeks to address both China\u2019s achievements and the internal limitations and contradictions of this strategy.<\/p>\n
The new frontiers of power encompass domains whose control enables indirect yet profound influence over other actors. Unlike classical military power, which is costly and high-risk, influence in these areas is often gradual, relatively low-cost, and politically deniable. China recognized this reality earlier than many of its competitors and, instead of focusing exclusively on short-term competition, has devoted significant resources to building long-term infrastructural and institutional capacities.<\/p>\n
In effect, rather than fighting over \u201coutcomes,\u201d Beijing seeks to redesign the \u201cplaying field.\u201d This logic is clearly observable in areas such as the Arctic, the deep seabed, outer space, digital standards, and the global financial system.<\/p>\n
One of the key elements of China\u2019s strategy is systematic penetration of existing international institutions and, where necessary, the creation of parallel institutions. In the domain of the deep seabed, China, through active participation in the International Seabed Authority, has secured a privileged position in decision-making processes concerning the future extraction of mineral resources. In the Arctic, although China is not an Arctic state, it has nonetheless established itself as a legitimate actor through investment, scientific research, and multilateral diplomacy.<\/p>\n
In outer space, China\u2019s efforts to establish a joint research station with Russia exemplify this same pattern: the creation of an alternative institutional framework to challenge the U.S.-backed order. Although this initiative has thus far met with limited reception, even its early shortcomings underscore China\u2019s inclination toward long-term institutional competition.<\/p>\n
One of the most subtle yet consequential forms of China\u2019s leverage-building occurs in the realm of technological standard-setting. Efforts to redesign internet architecture demonstrate that Beijing fully understands the significance of codes, protocols, and standards in the distribution of power. Although these proposals have faced widespread resistance, the very attempt to institutionalize political and security preferences within global technical infrastructures reflects the depth of China\u2019s strategic outlook.<\/p>\n
Even in cases where China fails to impose its preferred standards, broad participation in standard-setting bodies and the increasing number of Chinese proposals and experts enable the country to slow, complicate, or steer processes\u2014an outcome that itself constitutes a form of structural leverage.<\/p>\n
The economic dimension of this strategy complements its institutional aspects. In recent years, China has demonstrated a willingness to use its dominance in global supply chains\u2014particularly in critical minerals\u2014as a tool of geopolitical pressure. Contrary to common perceptions, these actions are not ad hoc responses but are better understood within the framework of a prolonged economic war.<\/p>\n
Crucially, China applies these pressures in a calibrated manner: sufficient to send a deterrent signal, yet not so severe as to sever itself from vital markets and technologies. This balancing act reflects China\u2019s awareness of the constraints imposed by economic interdependence.<\/p>\n
Assessing China\u2019s position requires attention to three components: capacity, capital, and credibility. While China appears to enjoy significant advantages in the first two\u2014industrial capacity and financial resources\u2014it faces serious challenges in the realm of international credibility and trust. Institutional opacity, close ties between the state and corporations, and security concerns limit the effectiveness of China\u2019s levers. In other words, leverage without legitimacy and trust diminishes ultimate impact. This is the point at which China\u2019s strategy encounters an internal contradiction: the more it relies on harder levers, the more it may accelerate counter-reactions and efforts to reduce dependence.<\/p>\n
Moreover, despite its coherence, China\u2019s strategy faces substantial constraints. Population aging, weak domestic demand, industrial overcapacity, and challenges of domestic legitimacy are factors that may, over the long term, reduce China\u2019s ability to sustain extensive external and institutional investments. Accordingly, China\u2019s leverage-building can be understood as an effort to shape the conditions of future competition\u2014an effort whose success depends on China\u2019s capacity to adapt to internal limitations and external responses.<\/p>\n
China\u2019s strategy for dominating the new frontiers of power can be viewed as a deliberate attempt to shift geopolitical competition away from costly and high-risk arenas toward structural, institutional, and infrastructural domains. Through long-term investment in institution-building, standard-setting, and supply chains, China seeks to create levers that constrain rivals\u2019 choices even without direct confrontation. Nevertheless, this strategy is neither flawless nor uncontested. Deficits in trust, legitimacy, and normative appeal may undermine the effectiveness of China\u2019s material levers. Furthermore, the reactions of other powers\u2014particularly efforts to diversify supply chains and strengthen alternative institutions\u2014demonstrate that leverage-building is invariably accompanied by counter-leverage.<\/p>\n
Ultimately, China\u2019s experience illustrates that power in the twenty-first century is more than ever structural, accumulative, and dependent on control over the rules of the game. Whether China can convert these levers into sustained dominance remains an open question\u2014one whose answer depends not only on China\u2019s capabilities, but also on the reactions, coalitions, and innovations of other actors in the international system.<\/p>\n
References<\/strong><\/p>\n Economy, E. (2026). How China wins the future: Beijing\u2019s strategy to seize the new frontiers of power<\/em>. Foreign Affairs, 105(1), 58\u201372. Seyed Reza Hashemi Jebeli, China Studies Researcher and PhD Student of International Relations Great power competition in the twenty-first century is no longer defined solely through classical indicators such as gross domestic product, conventional military capabilities, or even superiority in isolated technologies. Instead, this competition increasingly revolves around control over infrastructural, institutional, and technological domains […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":43,"featured_media":2972,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[88,53,69],"tags":[],"coauthors":[112],"class_list":["post-2978","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-foreign-policy-commission","category-notes-en","category-young-researchers"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2978","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/43"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2978"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2978\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2979,"href":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2978\/revisions\/2979"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2972"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2978"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2978"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2978"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/coauthors?post=2978"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
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