{"id":3152,"date":"2026-02-12T21:29:29","date_gmt":"2026-02-12T17:59:29","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/?p=3152"},"modified":"2026-02-12T21:33:36","modified_gmt":"2026-02-12T18:03:36","slug":"chinas-approach-toward-domestic-and-international-threats-against-iran-the-paradigm-of-national-sovereignty-and-the-global-security-initiative","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/chinas-approach-toward-domestic-and-international-threats-against-iran-the-paradigm-of-national-sovereignty-and-the-global-security-initiative\/","title":{"rendered":"China\u2019s Approach toward Domestic and International Threats against Iran: The Paradigm of National Sovereignty and the Global Security Initiative"},"content":{"rendered":"

Ahmadreza Yousefvand<\/strong>
\nResearch Deputy, Iranian Institute for Belt and Road Studies<\/p>\n

Geopolitical cooperation between the People\u2019s Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Iran has become a cornerstone of an emerging multipolar order, one consequence of which is the challenge it poses to traditional U.S. hegemony in the Middle East. This cooperation is not merely a bilateral agreement on energy and trade; rather, it reflects a profound normative shift in international relations. In practice, Beijing provides Tehran with a diplomatic, economic, and increasingly technological shield against a range of existential threats. While Iran faces escalating external military pressure from the United States and the Israeli regime, China\u2019s response has thus far consisted of two essential components: adherence to the principle of national sovereignty and a degree of strategic support. This approach derives from the Global Security Initiative (GSI), which emphasizes the indivisibility of security\u2014a concept employed both to delegitimize Western interventionism and to enhance China\u2019s role as a principal alternative to the U.S.-led global order.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The Global Security Initiative and the Paradigm of National Sovereignty<\/strong><\/p>\n

China\u2019s engagement with Iran is grounded in the Global Security Initiative, a conceptual framework introduced by President Xi Jinping that elevates national sovereignty and non-interference to the status of absolute international obligations. By stressing that \u201cthe legitimate security concerns of all countries must be taken seriously,\u201d China provides a framework in which Iran\u2019s regional influence and nuclear program are interpreted as defensive responses to external expansionism and coercion. This strategy aims to limit U.S. power through the promotion of an alternative security architecture based on \u201cChina-centricity\u201d and the rejection of \u201cbloc confrontation.\u201d<\/p>\n

The Chinese government largely views threats against Iran through the lens of its rivalry with the United States. For Beijing, a stable Iran is important for three main reasons: first, it guarantees a reliable flow of energy independent of direct U.S. dollar influence; second, it diverts U.S. military resources away from the Indo-Pacific; and third, it functions as a critical geographic node in the Belt and Road Initiative. Consequently, any threat to Iran is seen in Beijing as a potential victory for what it terms America\u2019s \u201cpredatory diplomacy,\u201d which must be neutralized whenever possible.<\/p>\n

At the same time, China avoids direct confrontation with the United States and seeks to manage the situation at minimal cost. China\u2019s expanding security role in Iran is primarily a protective measure for its energy investments. Decisions such as supplying air defense systems or conducting joint naval exercises stem from the need to prevent conflict spillover that could disrupt global energy markets and destabilize Belt and Road infrastructure. Beijing\u2019s active role in regional diplomacy is driven not by ambitions to act as a global policeman like the United States, but by commercial and strategic imperatives tied to safeguarding its modernization process.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

China\u2019s View of the Twelve-Day War<\/strong><\/p>\n

In 2025, the transformation of the long-standing shadow war between Israel and Iran into direct military confrontation marked a paradigm shift in the Middle East security environment. During this period, China\u2019s approach evolved from purely rhetorical support to active diplomatic backing and logistical assistance. A clear manifestation of this shift was Beijing\u2019s strong condemnation of Tel Aviv\u2019s actions during the June 2025 war.<\/p>\n

Fu Cong, China\u2019s ambassador, repeatedly described Israeli operations at UN Security Council briefings as \u201cmilitary adventurism\u201d and violations of fundamental norms of international relations and the UN Charter. This stance aimed to portray China as a defender of legitimate rights and interests in the Global South. When Israel sought to justify its attacks by citing imminent nuclear threats, Chinese officials and analysts dismissed these claims as baseless and aligned with regime-change objectives. This refusal to accept Israeli narratives signaled strategic alignment with Iran, as Beijing considers the collapse of Iran\u2014which would leave the United States unchallenged in the Persian Gulf\u2014to be a high-risk scenario.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Technical Support<\/strong><\/p>\n

One of the most significant yet ambiguous aspects of China\u2019s response to external threats is its willingness to act as a security partner when traditional allies such as Russia are preoccupied. Following attacks in 2024 and early 2025 that severely weakened Iran\u2019s Russian-made S-300 air defense systems, reports from Arab officials to Middle East Eye suggested that China had delivered surface-to-air missile batteries to Tehran. Although denied by Beijing, this transfer may indicate a departure from China\u2019s historical caution regarding direct arms sales to active conflict zones, particularly as social media widely circulated reports of multiple flights bound for Iran.<\/p>\n

Beyond this, China has played a decisive role in strengthening Iran through the sale of dual-use technologies. This has enabled Tehran to maintain its defense strategy despite international sanctions. Such technical cooperation ensures that while China avoids direct confrontation, Iran remains capable of posing a significant threat to U.S. and Israeli assets, thereby preserving the regional balance of power.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

U.S. Threats: Tariffs, Naval Power, and Economic Warfare<\/strong><\/p>\n

The return of the Trump administration in early 2026 led to intensified U.S. military and economic pressure on Iran, including the deployment of a massive naval fleet in the Indian Ocean and threats to impose punitive 25 percent tariffs on any country trading with Iran. Beijing\u2019s response to Washington\u2019s \u201cpredatory diplomacy\u201d combined firm resistance with systematic evasion. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning declared that \u201ctariff wars have no winners\u201d and that China would \u201cresolutely safeguard its legitimate rights and interests\u201d in trade with Iran.<\/p>\n

For China, tariff threats are part of a broader geopolitical struggle. To mitigate their impact, Beijing has accelerated the development of financial instruments operating outside the U.S. dollar system. These include the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) and the promotion of the yuan for oil settlements, allowing Tehran to bypass SWIFT and reduce the impact of maximum pressure policies.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

China and Digital Sovereignty in Iran<\/strong><\/p>\n

Beijing portrays Iran\u2019s internal unrest as \u201cforeign-instigated disturbances\u201d and as pretexts for military intervention. The January 2026 events, triggered by worsening economic conditions and foreign involvement, were met with a swift Iranian response. China\u2019s Foreign Ministry expressed confidence that the Iranian government could \u201covercome its current difficulties.\u201d This form of \u201cbiased neutrality\u201d demonstrated that Beijing would not join international condemnation efforts.<\/p>\n

A critical dimension of China\u2019s approach is cybersecurity support. Under the 25-year comprehensive strategic partnership agreement, China and Iran have expanded cooperation in \u201ccyberspace development\u201d and \u201cinformation infrastructure.\u201d<\/p>\n

At the UN Human Rights Council\u2019s special session in January 2026, China was among seven countries voting against extending the mandate of the fact-finding mission on Iran. Beijing argued that the session represented a political effort by Western powers to interfere in Iran\u2019s sovereignty and distract attention from Israeli actions in Gaza.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The Trilateral Pact: A New Model for Regional Security<\/strong><\/p>\n

The formal signing of a trilateral strategic pact between China, Iran, and Russia in late January 2026 represents the most significant shift in Middle Eastern relations in the twenty-first century. While not a formal mutual defense treaty, it explicitly aligns the three powers within a coordinated framework that rejects unilateral policies and defends nuclear sovereignty. This pact reflects China\u2019s regional strategy of integrating Iran into a broader Eurasian security architecture aimed at constructing a \u201cmultipolar order\u201d in which power is distributed among multiple independent decision-making centers.<\/p>\n

Through support from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS Plus, China has sought to end Western-led isolation of Iran and strengthen Tehran\u2019s position in Iraq, Syria, and the Persian Gulf.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Military and Naval Interoperability<\/strong><\/p>\n

The security dimension of this trilateral pact is most visible in the \u201cMaritime Security Belt\u201d naval exercises. In early 2026, these drills\u2014held in the Gulf of Oman and the Strait of Hormuz\u2014demonstrated operational coordination beyond mere political alignment. Scenarios included the liberation of hijacked vessels and tactical fleet formations, signaling China\u2019s growing role alongside sanctioned states in challenging U.S. naval dominance in key energy corridors.<\/p>\n

For Beijing, these exercises are essential for protecting its energy transport routes. With nearly 50 percent of China\u2019s crude oil imports passing through the Middle East, the security of the Strait of Hormuz is viewed as an existential interest. By conducting joint exercises with Iran and Russia, China presents itself as a provider of \u201cmaritime public goods\u201d and challenges the U.S. Navy\u2019s exclusive role as guarantor of freedom of navigation. This presence acts as a deterrent against any U.S. or Israeli plan to block the strait as a means of pressuring Tehran.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Balanced Diplomacy: The Saudi Arabia\u2013Iran\u2013China Triangle<\/strong><\/p>\n

Despite deepening ties with Tehran, China remains a pragmatic actor that avoids full alignment with any single regional power. A key component of its approach is mediating Saudi-Iranian relations, which Beijing views as essential for regional stability. The 2023 Beijing Agreement and its continued implementation through a trilateral joint committee in 2025 and 2026 illustrate China\u2019s role in reducing tensions before U.S. intervention becomes necessary.<\/p>\n

At a trilateral meeting in Tehran in December 2025, China encouraged Riyadh and Tehran to adhere to principles of good neighborliness and reject destabilizing interference by external powers. Beijing\u2019s strategy seeks to create a united regional front to address common challenges\u2014such as the Israel-Palestine conflict\u2014while marginalizing the U.S. role as security guarantor.<\/p>\n

At the same time, China\u2019s trade relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE far exceed those with Iran. Thus, China\u2019s support for Iran is tempered by the need to maintain comprehensive strategic partnerships with Gulf Cooperation Council states.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Limitations of China\u2019s Role<\/strong><\/p>\n

In-depth analysis shows that regional developments and threats against Iran provide strategic opportunities for global actors, including China. Beijing has mastered the art of quasi-mediation\u2014engaging in conflict resolution efforts to protect its interests without assuming the risks or costs associated with traditional mediation or security guarantees.<\/p>\n

One of the most important insights into China\u2019s strategy is the \u201casymmetry of importance.\u201d While Iran views China as a vital lifeline, Beijing regards Iran as a useful but non-essential strategic partner. This may explain why President Xi Jinping has not paid an official visit to Iran since 2016, despite extensive high-level exchanges with Gulf leaders.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Future Outlook: Strategic Projections for the Remainder of 2026<\/strong><\/p>\n

    \n
  1. Normalization of trilateral military exercises:<\/strong> The Maritime Security Belt is likely to become a permanent security mechanism and may expand to include other BRICS members such as Egypt or South Africa, further weakening U.S. maritime authority.<\/li>\n
  2. Financial decoupling:<\/strong> The use of the digital yuan and yuan-based settlements will become standard in China-Iran trade and serve as a model for other sanctioned states such as Russia.<\/li>\n
  3. Expansion of surveillance:<\/strong> Following the 2026 events, China is likely to increase technical assistance to Iran, focusing on AI-powered policing systems.<\/li>\n
  4. Escalation of \u201cveto diplomacy\u201d:<\/strong> China will probably continue using its permanent seat on the UN Security Council to block attempts to reimpose multilateral sanctions, effectively neutralizing the JCPOA snapback mechanism and forcing the U.S. into unilateralism, thereby alienating its European allies.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n

    China\u2019s approach to threats against Iran constitutes a comprehensive and integrated strategy designed to preserve the Islamic Republic as an effective anti-hegemonic partner while minimizing China\u2019s direct military exposure. Through the Global Security Initiative, Beijing has constructed a \u201csovereignty shield\u201d around Tehran, providing diplomatic cover, economic lifelines, and technical surveillance tools necessary to withstand internal volatility and external aggression. This partnership is not founded on shared ideology but on a strategic alignment against U.S. dominance.<\/p>\n

    As the Middle East enters an unprecedented period of turbulence in 2026, the China-Iran relationship will remain a central pillar of the emerging multipolar order, challenging Western-led deterrence and shaping the security architecture of the twenty-first century.<\/p>\n

    References <\/strong><\/p>\n

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    https:\/\/www.globaltimes.cn\/page\/202601\/1354168.shtml<\/a><\/p>\n

    China’s Normative Balancing: Global Security Initiative and Middle East Security Architecture, accessed February 1, 2026, available at:<\/p>\n

    https:\/\/cejiss.org\/images\/_2025\/19-3\/Nanda_CEJISS_19-3.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n

    China: The Global Security Initiative Concept Paper (full text) – CVD, accessed February 1, 2026, available at:<\/p>\n

    https:\/\/cvdvn.net\/2023\/02\/22\/china-the-global-security-initiative-concept-paper-full-text\/<\/a><\/p>\n

    China to continue to support Iran in safeguarding sovereignty, dignity: FM, accessed February 1, 2026, available at:<\/p>\n

    https:\/\/english.www.gov.cn\/news\/202507\/17\/content_WS687855fdc6d0868f4e8f43c8.html<\/a> \u00a0China’s Middle East Strategy in 2025: Between Iran and Israel – Beyond the Horizon ISSG, accessed February 1, 2026, available at:<\/p>\n

    https:\/\/behorizon.org\/between-tehran-and-tel-aviv-chinas-strategic-balancing-act-in-the-middle-east\/<\/a><\/p>\n

    China strongly condemns Israeli aggression against Iran, accessed February 1, 2026, available at:<\/p>\n

    https:\/\/socialistchina.org\/2025\/06\/15\/china-strongly-condemns-israeli-aggression-against-iran\/<\/a><\/p>\n

    China’s Facilitation of Sanctions and Export Control Evasion | U.S., accessed February 1, 2026, available at:<\/p>\n

    https:\/\/www.uscc.gov\/research\/chinas-facilitation-sanctions-and-export-control-evasion<\/a><\/p>\n

    Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning’s Regular Press Conference on January 13, 2026, accessed February 1, 2026, available at:<\/p>\n

    https:\/\/www.fmprc.gov.cn\/mfa_eng\/xw\/fyrbt\/202601\/t20260113_11812020.html<\/a><\/p>\n

    Human Rights Council Adopts Resolution Extending Mandates of Fact-Finding Mission and Special Rapporteur on Iran and Calling for an Urgent Investigation into Human Rights Violations in Iran in the Context of the Protests Beginning 28 December 2025 | OHCHR, accessed February 1, 2026, available at:<\/p>\n

    https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/en\/media-advisories\/2026\/01\/human-rights-council-adopts-resolution-extending-mandates-fact-finding<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    Ahmadreza Yousefvand Research Deputy, Iranian Institute for Belt and Road Studies Geopolitical cooperation between the People\u2019s Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Iran has become a cornerstone of an emerging multipolar order, one consequence of which is the challenge it poses to traditional U.S. hegemony in the Middle East. This cooperation is not […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":44,"featured_media":2987,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[88,57,69],"tags":[],"coauthors":[113],"class_list":["post-3152","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-foreign-policy-commission","category-strategic-reports-en","category-young-researchers"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3152","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/44"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3152"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3152\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3154,"href":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3152\/revisions\/3154"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3152"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3152"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3152"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/coauthors?post=3152"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}