{"id":3329,"date":"2026-06-27T14:07:13","date_gmt":"2026-06-27T10:37:13","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/?p=3329"},"modified":"2026-06-27T14:21:32","modified_gmt":"2026-06-27T10:51:32","slug":"redefining-the-geopolitics-of-eurasia-through-the-belt-and-road-initiative-a-comparison-with-the-marshall-plan-within-the-framework-of-structural-realism","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/redefining-the-geopolitics-of-eurasia-through-the-belt-and-road-initiative-a-comparison-with-the-marshall-plan-within-the-framework-of-structural-realism\/","title":{"rendered":"Redefining the Geopolitics of Eurasia through the Belt and Road Initiative: A Comparison with the Marshall Plan within the Framework of Structural Realism"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><em>Seyed Mohammad Shafiei, M.A. in International Relations<\/em><\/p>\n<p>Over the past decade, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has become central debates concerning the future of the international order and China\u2019s rising position within it. Introduced in 2013 by President Xi Jinping, this initiative appears on the surface to be a project aimed at infrastructure development, trade facilitation, and increased connectivity among Asia, Europe, and Africa. At a deeper level, however, it carries extensive geopolitical implications that are directly linked to transformations in the balance of power in Eurasia.<\/p>\n<p>The fundamental question is whether China, through the Belt and Road Initiative, is constructing a \u201cparallel order\u201d to the U.S.-led liberal order, or whether this initiative should instead be understood as part of the natural process of power redistribution within a transitioning international system. To address this question, the framework of structural realism provides an appropriate point of departure. Structural realism, particularly in the formulation of Kenneth Waltz, emphasizes that state behavior is shaped not by declared intentions but by their position within the global distribution of power. In this view, the international system is anarchic, and states seek to survive and enhance their security by increasing their relative power.<\/p>\n<p>From this perspective, China\u2019s rise as the world\u2019s second-largest economy and as an actor with extensive industrial, financial, and technological capacities will inevitably be accompanied by efforts to redefine its surrounding geopolitical environment. The Belt and Road Initiative can be understood precisely within this context: as an instrument for converting accumulated economic power into durable structural influence across Eurasia.<\/p>\n<p>Eurasia has always been a key region in classical geopolitical theories of power. From Halford Mackinder\u2019s theory to Nicholas Spykman\u2019s ideas, control over or influence in the \u201cHeartland\u201d has been regarded as a determining factor in the global balance of power. By creating a network of land and maritime corridors connecting China to Central Asia, Russia, the Middle East, Europe, and Africa, the Belt and Road Initiative effectively redraws the geopolitical map of this vast region.<\/p>\n<p>Through investments in transnational railways, oceanic ports, industrial zones, and energy corridors, China is building infrastructure that transports not only goods but also political influence and economic dependency. In realist logic, such networking represents an increase in structural power\u2014power derived from the ability to shape the choices of others.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<h2>Comparing the Belt and Road Initiative with the Marshall Plan: Geopolitical Dimensions<\/h2>\n<p>The comparison between the Belt and Road Initiative and the Marshall Plan\u2014implemented by the United States after World War II to rebuild Western Europe\u2014is often used to assess the geopolitical dimensions of the BRI. The Marshall Plan was launched in 1948 with the aim of reconstructing war-torn European economies and preventing the spread of Soviet influence. It not only contributed to Europe\u2019s economic recovery but also consolidated U.S. hegemony in the Western bloc and paved the way for the formation of institutions such as NATO and deep transatlantic economic integration. In other words, the Marshall Plan was an instrument for stabilizing a liberal order under American leadership.<\/p>\n<p>At first glance, certain similarities can be observed between the two initiatives:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>Both rely on large-scale investment, economic connectivity, and the integration of different regions into the economy of the initiating country, and both emerged within the context of great-power competition.<\/li>\n<li>Both go beyond purely economic projects and carry significant geopolitical implications.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>Nevertheless, important differences also exist. The Marshall Plan was implemented within a bipolar system characterized by explicit ideological rivalry, whereas the Belt and Road Initiative is unfolding in a more complex and multilayered international system. Unlike the United States in the 1940s, China is not a dominant hegemon but a rising power still confronting extensive networks of Western-led financial, security, and political institutions.<\/p>\n<p>There are also notable differences in instruments. The Marshall Plan relied primarily on grants and direct financial transfers, whereas the Belt and Road Initiative combines state loans, investments by Chinese companies, public\u2013private partnerships, and financing through development banks such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. This means that the BRI is less a project of \u201creconstruction\u201d and more a strategy of \u201cnetwork-building\u201d and intertwining economies within a new architecture of connectivity.<\/p>\n<p>This brings us back to the main question: does this network-building amount to the construction of a parallel order? To answer this, three levels must be distinguished: the infrastructural level, the institutional level, and the normative level.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li><strong> Infrastructural Level<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>At the infrastructural level, the Belt and Road Initiative is undoubtedly creating a network of transportation, energy, and communication routes centered on China. This can diversify traditional trade routes that have largely been under Western supervision or influence and reduce countries\u2019 dependence on Western financial and logistical infrastructures. Especially in Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and parts of Africa, China has become a key actor in infrastructure development. At this level, one can speak of the emergence of a \u201cgeopolitics of connectivity,\u201d in which power derives not only from military bases but also from corridors and ports.<\/p>\n<ol start=\"2\">\n<li><strong> Institutional Level<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>At the institutional level, China has sought to strengthen institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and to expand cooperation within forums such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, thereby creating frameworks that are complementary to, and in some cases competitors of, Western-centered institutions. However, these institutions have not yet replaced the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, or the dollar-centered financial system. Many BRI projects still operate in interaction with global financial structures, and China itself benefits from deep integration into the global economy. Therefore, at the institutional level, what we observe is more a form of \u201climited parallelization\u201d rather than the creation of a fully independent order.<\/p>\n<ol start=\"3\">\n<li><strong> Normative Level<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>At the normative level, China emphasizes that the Belt and Road Initiative is based on principles of non-interference, respect for sovereignty, and shared development. This narrative differs from the Western liberal discourse that stresses political reforms, transparency, and governance standards. However, the BRI has not yet articulated a global alternative ideology capable of broadly replacing liberalism. Thus, speaking of a fully parallel normative order may be premature.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Within the framework of structural realism, what matters is not China\u2019s declared intentions but the distributive consequences of the initiative. If the Belt and Road Initiative creates deep interdependence such that participating countries must take China\u2019s interests into account in their strategic decisions, then Beijing can be said to be increasing its structural power. This process does not necessarily imply the collapse of the existing order; rather, it may gradually alter the balance within it.<\/p>\n<p>In fact, the notion of a \u201cparallel order\u201d may not accurately capture the current situation. What we are witnessing is more a process of the \u201cmultilayering of the global order,\u201d in which China, alongside the United States and other powers, builds its own networks and institutions without necessarily withdrawing from existing structures. This may lead to a more complex and less hegemonic order\u2014one in which Eurasia becomes the core arena of geopolitical and geoeconomic competition.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<h2>Conclusion<\/h2>\n<p>The Belt and Road Initiative should be understood as part of China\u2019s grand strategy to consolidate its position as a central power in Eurasia and a decisive actor in the international system. In the logic of structural realism, it represents an effort to increase relative power and reduce vulnerability to external pressures.<\/p>\n<p>A comparison with the Marshall Plan shows that although both sought to deepen the initiating country\u2019s influence, their historical contexts, instruments, and structural positions differ significantly. China is still in the process of constructing its network of influence and remains some distance from establishing a fully parallel order. Nevertheless, if current trends continue, the Belt and Road Initiative may become one of the most important factors in redefining Eurasian geopolitics and gradually transforming the global order in the coming decades.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<h2>References<\/h2>\n<p>Atlantic Council. (2021). The Marshall Plan and the Belt and Road Initiative: More differences than similarities. Atlantic Council, available at:<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.atlanticcouncil.org\/in-depth-research-reports\/issue-brief\/the-marshall-plan-and-the-belt-and-road-initiative-more-differences-than-similarities\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">https:\/\/www.atlanticcouncil.org\/in-depth-research-reports\/issue-brief\/the-marshall-plan-and-the-belt-and-road-initiative-more-differences-than-similarities\/<\/a><\/p>\n<p>Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. (n.d.). Home. AIIB. available at:<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.aiib.org\/en\/index.html\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">https:\/\/www.aiib.org\/en\/index.html<\/a><\/p>\n<p>Beeson, M., &amp; Crawford, C. (2023). Putting the BRI in perspective: History, hegemony and geoeconomics. Chinese Political Science Review, 8, 45\u201362, available at: <a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/s41111-022-00210-y\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/s41111-022-00210-y<\/a><\/p>\n<p>Council on Foreign Relations. (2023). China\u2019s massive Belt and Road Initiative, available at: <a href=\"https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/backgrounder\/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/backgrounder\/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative<\/a><\/p>\n<p>Liu, L. (2025, March 17). How the Belt and Road Initiative is reshaping global logistics. Tonlexing. available at:<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.tonlexing.com\/how-the-belt-and-road-initiative-is-reshaping-global-logistics\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">https:\/\/www.tonlexing.com\/how-the-belt-and-road-initiative-is-reshaping-global-logistics<\/a><\/p>\n<p>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2018). The Belt and Road Initiative in the global trade, investment and finance landscape (Chapter 2). In OECD Business and Finance Outlook 2018. OECD Publishing. available at:<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1787\/9789264298828-en\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1787\/9789264298828-en<\/a><\/p>\n<p>Rolland, N. (2017). China\u2019s Eurasian Century? Political and Strategic Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative. National Bureau of Asian Research, available at:<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.nbr.org\/publication\/chinas-eurasian-century-political-and-strategic-implications-of-the-belt-and-road-initiative\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">https:\/\/www.nbr.org\/publication\/chinas-eurasian-century-political-and-strategic-implications-of-the-belt-and-road-initiative<\/a><\/p>\n<p>Shen, S., &amp; Chan, W. (2018). A comparative study of the Belt and Road Initiative and the Marshall Plan. Palgrave Communications, 4, Article 32, available at:<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1057\/s41599-018-0077-9\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1057\/s41599-018-0077-9<\/a><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Seyed Mohammad Shafiei, M.A. in International Relations Over the past decade, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has become central debates concerning the future of the international order and China\u2019s rising position within it. Introduced in 2013 by President Xi Jinping, this initiative appears on the surface to be a project aimed at infrastructure development, [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":51,"featured_media":3325,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[88,53,69],"tags":[],"coauthors":[119],"class_list":["post-3329","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-foreign-policy-commission","category-notes-en","category-young-researchers"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3329","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/51"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3329"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3329\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3335,"href":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3329\/revisions\/3335"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/3325"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3329"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3329"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3329"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iranbri.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/coauthors?post=3329"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}