Beyond Anti-China and Pro-China: The Necessity of Institutionalizing Chinese Studies in Iran
Dr. Mohammadreza Majidi, Professor of Law and Political Science, University of Tehran

Introduction
In recent decades, the People’s Republic of China has become one of the key players in the international system, and in particular, a significant potential and actual partner for the Islamic Republic of Iran. The intensification of China-U.S. competition, the “Belt and Road” initiative, and shifting geopolitical balances in East and West Asia have further highlighted China’s position in Iran’s strategic calculations. However, despite the expansion of political and economic interactions between the two countries, Iran’s understanding of China still faces serious theoretical and analytical shortcomings.

The dominant discourse on China in Iran’s public, media, and even among some elites has largely taken shape within a simplistic bipolar framework: on one hand, “anti-China” sentiment portrays China as an opportunistic or threatening actor, or another version of foreign domination; on the other hand, “pro-China” sentiment introduces China as a strategic ally aligned with Iran and an alternative to the West. Although these two approaches appear contradictory, they share a fundamental characteristic: a lack of scientific, analytical, and deep understanding of China’s complex reality.

This paper aims to demonstrate that the main problem in Iran-China relations lies not merely at the level of politics or the structure of the international system but at the epistemological and knowledge level. In other words, the absence of “institutionalized Chinese studies” in Iran has led to analyses and policies that are largely reactive or based on short-term considerations rather than grounded in a realistic understanding of China’s history, political culture, development logic, and foreign policy behavior?. The central question of this paper is: “Why has Chinese studies not been institutionalized as a field of knowledge in Iran, and what consequences has this gap had for Iran’s discourse and policymaking toward Chin”

To answer this question, the paper first briefly examines the dominant anti-China and pro-China discourses in Iran using a critical-analytical approach. It then discusses Chinese studies and their status in Iran, and finally offers policy recommendations to move beyond the current situation.

Anti-China and Pro-China Discourses in Iran
The representation of China in Iranian discourse is often shaped not by systematic study or historical-social understanding but by ideological assumptions, limited experiences, or imported models. Two main approaches can be identified:

a) Anti-China Sentiment: Threat-Oriented and Imitative Perspective
Anti-China sentiment in Iran often stems from a combination of historical, cultural, and discursive factors. On one hand, a negative mindset toward “great powers” and historical experiences of foreign influence interpret China as an extension of the same domineering patterns. On the other hand, a significant portion of this perspective is influenced by Western media and analytical narratives about China—narratives that portray China as a threat to the liberal global order, an opaque actor, and a violator of international norms.

The main issue with anti-China sentiment in Iran is that it analyzes China not as a “civilization-state” with its own logic of development and foreign policy but as a “threatening other,” akin to historical experiences with the West. This approach overlooks the potential for cooperation, the structural differences between China and Western powers, and the complexity of its behavior.

b) Pro-China Sentiment: Reactive and Instrumentalist Perspective
In contrast, pro-China sentiment is largely a reaction to Western pressure and U.S. sanctions. In this discourse, China is portrayed as a “natural strategic partner” or an “anti-Western ally.” This image is rooted more in the needs of Iran’s foreign policy than in an analysis of China’s national interests. Like anti-China sentiment, pro-China discourse suffers from simplification. It downplays the competitive nature of China’s foreign policy, the priority of economic interests, and Beijing’s cautious, non-ideological approach to international relations. The result is the formation of unrealistic expectations of China and periodic frustrations in bilateral relations.

Although anti-China and pro-China discourses appear opposed, both hinder the formation of a realistic understanding of China. Both treat China as a “political object” rather than a “subject of scientific study.” In such an environment, Chinese studies, as an independent field of knowledge, lacks the opportunity to emerge and become institutionalized.

The Necessity of Institutionalizing Chinese Studies in Iran
To move beyond the non-analytical binary of anti-China and pro-China sentiment, merely changing political discourse is insufficient. Instead, structural and long-term investment in the field of knowledge and its producing institutions is required. In this regard, several specific policy recommendations are proposed:

a) Strengthening Academic Chinese Studies
It is essential to establish and develop interdisciplinary Chinese studies programs in universities (covering history, language, political culture, political economy, and foreign policy). Chinese studies should not be limited to broader “Oriental studies” or merely international relations but require an independent academic identity.

b) Prioritizing Language Education and Primary Sources
One of the fundamental weaknesses of Chinese studies in Iran is excessive reliance on secondary sources and Western translations. Academic policymaking should treat Chinese language education and access to primary sources as strategic priorities

c) Bridging Knowledge and Policymaking
.Creating institutional mechanisms for continuous dialogue between Chinese studies researchers and decision-making bodies can help reduce the gap between scientific analysis and political practice in this field

d) Depoliticizing Chinese Studies
Chinese studies is neither a tool for political propaganda nor a means to justify or undermine foreign relations. Recognizing the relative autonomy of the field of knowledge is a necessary condition for producing reliable and long-term analyses.

In summary, without moving beyond the binary of anti-China and pro-China sentiment and without serious investment in Chinese studies, Iran-China relations will inevitably experience fluctuations, misunderstandings, and miscalculations. Chinese studies is not a secondary or marginal option but a prerequisite for realistic foreign policy and any action in bilateral relations.