By Seyed Mohammad Ali Modarresi Yazdi,
Asia-Pacific Researcher and MA Student of Southeast Asian Studies, University of Tehran

According to a Reuters report dated 13 Azar 1404 (December 4), China has begun assembling its naval fleet for what is considered its largest display of maritime power in recent years. More than one hundred warships, support vessels, and coast guard units have been deployed across various areas of the western Pacific Ocean and the surrounding waters of East Asia. The simultaneous presence of such a large number of naval units conveys several key messages.

On the one hand, these maritime maneuvers demonstrate China’s integrated command-and-control capability in rapid mobilization, inter-agency coordination, and sustained operational presence in disputed areas. This capability has been significantly strengthened since the era of former Communist Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin through the integration of joint command structures, networking of naval units, and upgrades to surveillance and communication systems.

On the other hand, analysts interpret this action as a sign that China has placed the “Three Warfares Strategy” on its agenda—comprising psychological warfare, public opinion warfare, and legal warfare. This strategy aims to exploit adversaries’ weaknesses, conceal China’s real objectives, and create favorable conditions for achieving Beijing’s national interests. In line with the principles of Sun Tzu’s Art of War, China seeks to accomplish its goals without engaging in direct military confrontation.

Prior to the recent escalation of tensions between Tokyo and Beijing, the People’s Republic of China had pursued what is known as a multilayered presence tactic, or the so-called “cabbage strategy,” to gradually and carefully expand its presence in disputed areas such as the Senkaku, Paracel, and Spratly Islands. Under this model, China deployed layered actors—including organized fishing fleets, economic infrastructure, coast guard units, and naval combat forces—in a slow and quiet process of encircling sensitive areas, particularly around the Senkaku Islands.

However, recent statements by the Japanese Prime Minister—viewed by Beijing as crossing China’s strategic red lines—disrupted this earlier equation and paved the way for a shift from gradual multilayered tactics toward a more aggressive and comprehensive framework: the Three Warfares Strategy.

The Three Warfares Strategy

The Three Warfares Strategy was approved in 2003 by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the Central Military Commission and was incorporated into the political guidelines of the People’s Liberation Army. This doctrine consists of public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare. Although each domain has distinct functions, they are so closely interconnected that clear boundaries between them are often difficult to draw. For example, public opinion warfare creates favorable domestic and international sentiment that supports psychological and legal operations, while legal warfare provides legitimacy for psychological and public opinion campaigns.

The objective of psychological warfare is to weaken the enemy’s ability to conduct military operations by inducing shock and reducing morale among both military personnel and civilian populations that support them. This is achieved through propaganda via television, the internet, print media, and conventional tactics such as military threats, exercises, displays of force, and showcasing advanced weapons systems.

One example is the publication of provocative tweets by various Chinese Foreign Ministry bodies, including a tweet from the Chinese Embassy in Japan claiming that, based on a provision of the UN Charter, China has the right to take military action if it feels threatened by Japan. The tweet also referred to Japan’s historical membership in fascist groups and emphasized China’s role as one of the founding members of the United Nations. Furthermore, China’s potential naval power display mentioned earlier can also be considered an instance of psychological warfare.

Public opinion warfare aims to influence domestic and international public opinion in order to legitimize China’s actions and discourage adversaries from taking measures contrary to Beijing’s interests. One manifestation of this effort is the revival of memories of World War II and Japan’s role among the Axis powers. In this context, hashtags such as “militaristic Japan” circulated on Chinese social media platforms. These campaigns, influenced by various factors, both reminded domestic audiences of historical wartime atrocities committed by Japan and portrayed Japan as an aggressive actor in the eyes of the international community.

Legal warfare uses international and domestic laws to claim legal superiority and advance China’s interests. This strategy can be employed to restrict the adversary’s freedom of action, shape the operational environment, gain international support, and manage the political consequences of China’s military measures.

Within this framework, China has actively used legal and diplomatic mechanisms in recent weeks to consolidate its positions on Japan and the Taiwan crisis. For example, according to Reuters reports on November 23 and 25, Fu Cong, China’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, sent two official letters to the President of the Security Council and the President of the General Assembly, describing Japan’s stance on Taiwan as a violation of the “One China” principle and as interference in China’s internal affairs. He emphasized the necessity for the international community to adhere to international law and the UN Charter.

Simultaneously, on December 2, according to China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China and Russia issued a joint statement during a bilateral security meeting reaffirming that “Taiwan is an inseparable part of China’s territory” and that the two sides had reached strategic consensus on the issue. This action was intended to create legal and political backing against Japanese and Western narratives.

In addition, on December 4, according to Xinhua News Agency, during a recent meeting between Xi Jinping and Emmanuel Macron, China once again stressed the One China principle and the illegality of any foreign support for Taiwan’s independence, seeking to reinforce this stance through legal and diplomatic language in its engagement with key European actors.

Conclusion

It can therefore be concluded that China’s recent expansion of its maritime presence and its demonstrations of power in East Asian waters are not merely military exercises but part of Beijing’s broader Three Warfares Strategy. Through the simultaneous use of public opinion, psychological, and legal tools, this strategy seeks to establish the political, cognitive, and legal conditions necessary to secure China’s national interests without resorting to direct military conflict.

Within this framework, large-scale military maneuvers serve a dual role: on the one hand, they display China’s readiness and command cohesion; on the other, they function as instruments of psychological and propaganda warfare aimed at influencing domestic, regional, and international public opinion.

At the same time, Beijing is using legal and diplomatic tools to frame its actions as legitimate under international law, thereby limiting the range of actions available to its rivals—especially Japan and its Western allies.

Such developments indicate China’s transition from a policy of gradual presence (the cabbage strategy) to an active and multidimensional approach. This approach seeks not only to preserve China’s position in regional disputes but also to expand control over the Senkaku Islands and consolidate China’s strategic standing in the East China Sea.