Seyed Reza Hashemi Jebeli, China Studies Researcher and PhD Student of International Relations

Great power competition in the twenty-first century is no longer defined solely through classical indicators such as gross domestic product, conventional military capabilities, or even superiority in isolated technologies. Instead, this competition increasingly revolves around control over infrastructural, institutional, and technological domains that shape the frameworks of the future global order—what may be referred to as the “new frontiers of power.” In this context, the People’s Republic of China has, over the past two decades, pursued a gradual, multilayered, and long-term strategy aimed not merely at increasing national power, but at creating structural levers for the sustained exercise of influence within the international system. This article argues that China’s leverage-building is not the outcome of short-term reactive measures, but rather the product of an accumulative and structural strategy designed to shape the rules of the game prior to the consolidation of a future order. It seeks to address both China’s achievements and the internal limitations and contradictions of this strategy.

New Frontiers of Power and China’s Strategic Logic

The new frontiers of power encompass domains whose control enables indirect yet profound influence over other actors. Unlike classical military power, which is costly and high-risk, influence in these areas is often gradual, relatively low-cost, and politically deniable. China recognized this reality earlier than many of its competitors and, instead of focusing exclusively on short-term competition, has devoted significant resources to building long-term infrastructural and institutional capacities.

In effect, rather than fighting over “outcomes,” Beijing seeks to redesign the “playing field.” This logic is clearly observable in areas such as the Arctic, the deep seabed, outer space, digital standards, and the global financial system.

Institution-Building and Institutional Influence as Tools of Leverage

One of the key elements of China’s strategy is systematic penetration of existing international institutions and, where necessary, the creation of parallel institutions. In the domain of the deep seabed, China, through active participation in the International Seabed Authority, has secured a privileged position in decision-making processes concerning the future extraction of mineral resources. In the Arctic, although China is not an Arctic state, it has nonetheless established itself as a legitimate actor through investment, scientific research, and multilateral diplomacy.

In outer space, China’s efforts to establish a joint research station with Russia exemplify this same pattern: the creation of an alternative institutional framework to challenge the U.S.-backed order. Although this initiative has thus far met with limited reception, even its early shortcomings underscore China’s inclination toward long-term institutional competition.

Technical Standards and Digital Architecture

One of the most subtle yet consequential forms of China’s leverage-building occurs in the realm of technological standard-setting. Efforts to redesign internet architecture demonstrate that Beijing fully understands the significance of codes, protocols, and standards in the distribution of power. Although these proposals have faced widespread resistance, the very attempt to institutionalize political and security preferences within global technical infrastructures reflects the depth of China’s strategic outlook.

Even in cases where China fails to impose its preferred standards, broad participation in standard-setting bodies and the increasing number of Chinese proposals and experts enable the country to slow, complicate, or steer processes—an outcome that itself constitutes a form of structural leverage.

Political Economy and Long-Term Economic Warfare

The economic dimension of this strategy complements its institutional aspects. In recent years, China has demonstrated a willingness to use its dominance in global supply chains—particularly in critical minerals—as a tool of geopolitical pressure. Contrary to common perceptions, these actions are not ad hoc responses but are better understood within the framework of a prolonged economic war.

Crucially, China applies these pressures in a calibrated manner: sufficient to send a deterrent signal, yet not so severe as to sever itself from vital markets and technologies. This balancing act reflects China’s awareness of the constraints imposed by economic interdependence.

Structural Constraints and the Sustainability of the Strategy

Assessing China’s position requires attention to three components: capacity, capital, and credibility. While China appears to enjoy significant advantages in the first two—industrial capacity and financial resources—it faces serious challenges in the realm of international credibility and trust. Institutional opacity, close ties between the state and corporations, and security concerns limit the effectiveness of China’s levers. In other words, leverage without legitimacy and trust diminishes ultimate impact. This is the point at which China’s strategy encounters an internal contradiction: the more it relies on harder levers, the more it may accelerate counter-reactions and efforts to reduce dependence.

Moreover, despite its coherence, China’s strategy faces substantial constraints. Population aging, weak domestic demand, industrial overcapacity, and challenges of domestic legitimacy are factors that may, over the long term, reduce China’s ability to sustain extensive external and institutional investments. Accordingly, China’s leverage-building can be understood as an effort to shape the conditions of future competition—an effort whose success depends on China’s capacity to adapt to internal limitations and external responses.

Conclusion

China’s strategy for dominating the new frontiers of power can be viewed as a deliberate attempt to shift geopolitical competition away from costly and high-risk arenas toward structural, institutional, and infrastructural domains. Through long-term investment in institution-building, standard-setting, and supply chains, China seeks to create levers that constrain rivals’ choices even without direct confrontation. Nevertheless, this strategy is neither flawless nor uncontested. Deficits in trust, legitimacy, and normative appeal may undermine the effectiveness of China’s material levers. Furthermore, the reactions of other powers—particularly efforts to diversify supply chains and strengthen alternative institutions—demonstrate that leverage-building is invariably accompanied by counter-leverage.

Ultimately, China’s experience illustrates that power in the twenty-first century is more than ever structural, accumulative, and dependent on control over the rules of the game. Whether China can convert these levers into sustained dominance remains an open question—one whose answer depends not only on China’s capabilities, but also on the reactions, coalitions, and innovations of other actors in the international system.

References

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