Kamand Bahrami
Researcher in China Studies and Executive Secretary of the Iranian Institute of Belt and Road Studies

The year 1404 (2025) marked one of the most significant historical periods for the Islamic Republic of Iran in strengthening economic independence and resisting international pressure. With Donald Trump’s return to power and the continuation of Washington’s restrictive policies, Iran entered a strategic path of redefining its international relations. In this context, the role of the People’s Republic of China—as Iran’s principal strategic partner and a global power inclined toward sustainable cooperation with Tehran—became more important than ever.

Iranian expectations from China in this year were primarily centered on strengthening national resilience and utilizing bilateral capacities to overcome sanctions-related obstacles.

Macroeconomic Context and Strategic Outlook in the 1404 Budget

Iran’s economic developments in 1404 reflected broad efforts to achieve development goals amid regional and global constraints. With a realistic outlook, the government regarded the deepening of economic relations with China in the 1404 budget as a “positive opportunity” and a strategic path for industrial modernization and resolving challenges arising from energy imbalances.

China’s position as Iran’s largest export destination was further strengthened. Allocating a major share of oil exports to the Chinese market indicated a strong and strategic bond between the two countries, ensuring Iran’s foreign-exchange revenue stability and enhancing Iran’s role in East Asia’s energy supply chain.

Iranian political elites expected China, as a “strategic buyer,” to resist U.S. unilateralism and tariff threats and to facilitate financial resources for infrastructure projects and productive sector investments.

Table 1. Statistical Analysis of Economic Indicators and China’s Expected Role in 1404

Approach of Economic Elites

Based on this study, Iranian economic elites in 1404 believed that China should continue acting as the engine of trade cooperation through parallel financial networks. New payment systems and barter trade mechanisms became effective tools for neutralizing sanctions.

Parallel financial networks and modern payment systems:
Mechanisms such as alternative international payment systems and barter trade (e.g., oil in exchange for consumer goods or technology) became key instruments for bypassing sanctions.

Impact on domestic production:
Iran expects China to assist domestic production through advanced technology transfer (e.g., petrochemicals, automotive, renewable energy) and infrastructure investment, thereby reducing dependence on imports.

Political–Security Expectations of the Iranian State in an Era of Crises

In 1404, Iran faced existential threats, including air strikes on nuclear facilities and a 12-day war. Political elites expected China to go beyond diplomatic statements and provide “effective security support.”

Iran emphasized strengthening its defense capabilities (through military cooperation with China) and activating multilateral diplomacy with an Eastern orientation. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China was expected to protect Iran against Western pressure and sanctions.

Regional stability is viewed by China as equivalent to energy security. Iran considers itself a pillar of China’s energy security, particularly in transit corridors such as the Belt and Road Initiative. Consequently, Iran expects China to play a more active role in maintaining stability in the Middle East, especially in the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran also expects China to transfer advanced technologies in areas such as missile systems, drones, cyber defense, and air defense, thereby shifting the regional balance of power in Iran’s favor.

China’s Role in Managing Domestic Crises and Regime Stability

The events of Dey 1404 (December 2025) generated new expectations regarding security technologies. Political elites expect China, as a “digital strategic partner,” to provide tools for controlling cyberspace and strengthening surveillance infrastructure.

Reports on Chinese companies such as Tiandy assisting in tracking civil activists indicate partial realization of these expectations. Iran expects China to view Tehran’s stability as part of its own energy and trade corridor security.

Some Chinese analysts, including Hu Xijin, argue that despite internal pressures, Iran’s political system will demonstrate resilience due to military elite commitment and religious roots—provided that China continues its economic and technological support.

Diplomacy under Trump’s Threats and the Snapback Mechanism

With Trump’s return and his threats of heavy tariffs on countries cooperating with Iran, Tehran expected Beijing to function as a “tariff shield.” While China opposed unilateralism diplomatically, Iranian elites remain concerned that China might sacrifice Iran in a grand bargain with Washington.

During the activation of the snapback mechanism by European powers, Iran expects China to defend Iranian sovereignty and act as a counterbalance to U.S. pressure.

The 25-Year Cooperation Agreement: From Idealism to Infrastructure Realities

In 1404, the Iran–China 25-year cooperation agreement entered a challenging phase. Iranian expectations focused on:

• Development of transit infrastructure and energy corridors:
  Projects such as the Mashhad–Herat railway connection to China via the Wakhan Corridor were prioritized.
• Industrial challenges and technology transfer:
  In automotive and renewable energy sectors, Iran sought technology transfer. However, reports indicate China preferred selling products rather than investing in long-term industrial partnerships.

Table 2. Iran’s Expectations and Current Status in Different Cooperation Sectors

Academic and Expert Views: Critique of “Strategic Romanticism”

Iranian academic discourse in 1404 shifted toward realism. Scholars criticized the assumption that Iran is existentially vital to China’s security. They argue that China seeks managed competition with the U.S. and does not prioritize Iran over its broader global interests.

They also highlight the lack of a coherent long-term strategy, structural barriers to Chinese investment (bureaucracy, sanctions, lack of decision-making unity), and limited tangible Chinese security support during military crises.

Conclusion

The expectations of Iranian society and governance from China in 1404 reveal a duality and perceptual gap. On one hand, the official narrative views China as a strategic and capable partner in economic recovery and national security. On the other, public opinion and academic elites remain skeptical about the realization of promises and balance of interests.

China’s cooperation with Iran operates within its own national interests and international constraints, avoiding heavy security costs. The failure to achieve some major expectations—such as large-scale investment and sensitive technology transfer—demonstrates the need for a realistic reassessment of the “Look East” strategy and for transforming emergency cooperation into a sustainable, reciprocal strategic partnership.

Resources

Analyzing China’s Attitudes Towards Iran and the Middle East, January 28, 2026 Brookings Institution, “How is China positioning itself as Iran’s regime teeters?”, January 2026.

Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), “As Protests Surge, China Signals Its Distance From Tehran”, January 2026.

RFE/RL, “China’s Ties With Iran Show Their Limits Amid Protests And US Threats”, January 2026.

China-Global South Project, “Chinese Analysts: Iran Will Endure External Pressure”, January 2026.

What’s on Weibo, “The Weibo Battlefield in the US-Iran Conflict”, January 2026.

IranWire, “China’s Limited Support for Iran During War Exposes Partnership Gaps”, August 2025.

Rostam Zyaei, “Is China Cautious or is Iran Hesitant?”, Scientific Notes, February 2026.

Global Times, “Iranian and US embassies launch war of words on China’s social media”, 2026.

INSS, “China’s Interests in the Israel–Iran War”, 2026.

IRNA News Agency, “Iran-China Rail Connection via Afghanistan”, January 2026.