With the Cultural Revolution in the 1980s, China quickly emerged as one of the world’s rising powers, surpassing other major global powers in various fields, especially economically, and positioning itself as the world’s second-largest economy after the United States. Parallel to China’s adoption of an economic development policy, its need for fossil energy resources like oil and gas increased. This need has been the primary driver for China’s active foreign policy in the Middle East, particularly the Persian Gulf. Furthermore, the rise of religious fundamentalism and Salafism in West Asia, coupled with the presence of a Muslim minority in China, has added to Beijing’s concerns. In addition to these factors, the geopolitical and geoeconomic position of West Asia, especially for planning China’s development programs such as the Silk Road, economic cooperation, the market for Chinese goods (especially armaments), and its competition with the United States, have all contributed to Beijing’s focus on the West Asia region.
On the other hand, Iran’s powerful presence in the region, as a country challenging American power, provides a suitable opportunity for China’s pragmatic foreign policy to make the best use of these regional opportunities in its trade and economic competition against the United States. With increasing sensitivities surrounding Iran’s nuclear file and the imposition of sanctions against Iran, adopting an “Eastward Look” policy and cooperating with non-Western countries became one of the priorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran to counter the heavy pressures from the Western front. This is clearly evident in the statements of Ayatollah Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of the Revolution. During a meeting with the people of Azerbaijan on February 18, 2018 (29 Bahman 1396), Ayatollah Khamenei stated: “In foreign policy, preferring the East over the West, preferring neighbors over distant countries, preferring nations and countries that share common ground with us over others, is one of our priorities today.”
Establishing and expanding friendly relations between Iran and China, as cradles of civilization in East and West Asia, has long been a focus for both countries. Nevertheless, international relations scholars consistently refer to the “Look East” policy, especially towards China, as the missing link in Iran’s foreign policy. This is because, in addition to a lack of a clear practical approach, there is no clear understanding of this issue among Iranian students and professors of international relations. On the one hand, China has been considered one of the major and influential powers in recent decades, and on the other hand, due to sanctions, the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has consistently tried to reduce international pressures by expanding relations with third countries. However, despite this, we observe that the foreign policies of the two countries have been limited solely to economic relations and some coordination in international forums. Even some policies of both sides are sometimes in clear contradiction with each other’s interests. In this regard, one can refer to China’s positions on the three Iranian islands and Iran’s choice of India for the Chabahar Port development project. The aforementioned cases double the necessity of aligning Tehran’s and Beijing’s Middle Eastern policies. Achieving this depends on overcoming challenges and strengthening existing opportunities and capacities in the relations between the two countries.
Challenges Ahead
The most important challenges in aligning the relations between the two countries can be categorized as follows:
Ambiguity in China’s Vision for Global Governance: The increase in China’s domestic and international power components, coinciding with the pursuit of global governance programs such as the “Belt and Road Initiative,” has led researchers and international relations scholars to discuss the future of the world and a potential shift in its polarity from West to East. Consequently, some researchers believe that China seeks to present a global model where achieving benefits is possible for all members, aiming for a multipolar system that allows for universal benefit through structural reforms. In contrast, others, advocating the “China Threat Theory,” believe that China, like its predecessors, will alter the global order to suit its own objectives and establish a world aligned with its goals and ideas. This divergence in approaches regarding China’s future and Beijing’s strategy for global governance in the coming years has also caused a division of opinions among Iranian elites. Therefore, the foreign policy decision-makers of the Islamic Republic cannot envision a clear outlook for themselves regarding Beijing’s future goals and plans, which leads them to always prioritize caution in their relations with Beijing.
Asymmetry: Despite many years of relations between Iran and China and both sides achieving their desired goals and benefits from cooperation, the relationship between the two countries has grown asymmetrically, and this asymmetry is one of the major obstacles to expanding their ties. This asymmetry manifests itself in various forms in the economic sphere. Even without considering the economic size of the two countries, which easily demonstrates this imbalance, it must be said that Beijing has been Iran’s most important trading partner, with a significant portion of Iran’s exports to and imports from China. In contrast, China’s exports to Iran constitute a negligible fraction of its total exports, and due to China’s balancing policy in West Asia, its need for Iranian oil, while important, can be compensated through other channels.
In the political sphere, this asymmetry reveals another aspect. While China is recognized as a global power and is even referred to as a superpower and future world leader, Iran, at best, is considered merely a regional power. Beyond the power of the two countries, one can also examine and compare their political roles. While Beijing is one of the most important political capitals in the world and China is one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, Iran is portrayed as a rogue state that has refused to accept all international norms and frameworks, and due to economic sanctions, other countries refrain from establishing political and economic relations with it.
This asymmetry is even observable in the two countries’ approaches to the existing order and structure. China, while accepting the current order, considers itself bound by international rules and laws and does not go beyond criticizing international structures and regimes. In contrast, Tehran views the continuation of these structures as contrary to its foreign policy goals and interests and seeks to dismantle their foundations. Based on this asymmetry, Tehran is not at a level of importance for Beijing that would warrant incurring costs. Beijing’s behavior in accompanying the members of the IAEA Board of Governors in referring Iran’s file to the Security Council, and even cooperating with the issuance of punitive resolutions by this council against Iran, can be well explained by this.
Ideological Threats: With the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the Islamic Republic has championed a school of thought and ideology with global aspirations, believing it can offer a universal program for the world without individuals being crushed under the wheels of a free economy and market logic, or sinking into a swamp by Smith’s invisible hand. A crucial question arising here is whether Beijing, if it becomes a superpower and achieves global leadership, and once the necessities that forced it into internal reforms and adaptation to international conditions disappear, will still rely on its current strategy, or will the tenets of authentic Marxism influence China’s current pragmatism after these exigencies are gone? The ambiguity in answering this question is one of the most significant challenges occupying the minds of policymakers and decision-makers not only in Iran but also in other countries.
Internal Political Competition in Iran: The lack of consistent strategic planning and follow-up in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic, where changes in government often lead to fundamental shifts in previous strategies, is a major issue that troubles Iran’s Eastern partners, especially Beijing. This has led them to believe that if Tehran finds the slightest opening for relations with the West, it will abandon its Eastern partners and relegate them to a secondary priority. This lack of a unified policy from the Islamic Republic, and the resulting beliefs and foreign policy behaviors it engenders in Iran’s partner countries, including China, is one of the most significant obstacles to planning a clear and common roadmap with Iran’s partners and allies.
Iran’s Regional Policies: The impact of Iran’s regional policies on the expansion of strategic relations between Iran and China can be examined from two different perspectives. The first approach, from the viewpoint of Chinese leaders and politicians, highlights the heavy costs that expanding relations with Tehran could impose on Beijing. Beijing currently cooperates at various levels, including technology transfer, participation in diverse economic projects, trade and commercial partnerships, and oil imports, with each of Iran’s two strategic and ideological rivals: the Zionist regime and Saudi Arabia. Naturally, the expansion of Tehran-Beijing relations might sensitize rival capitals, leading them to subsequently reduce their ties, which would result in significant economic losses in the region and, more importantly, jeopardize Beijing’s energy security. Furthermore, an increase in these relations could upset the existing balance in the region in Iran’s favor, which would draw Washington’s attention to the region, and Washington’s active and increased engagement in the region would be accompanied by risks to Beijing’s interests. Additionally, Washington might impose broader restrictions.
On the other hand, Iran, as a country that has raised the banner of justice-seeking, drawing on teachings such as the uprising of Imam Hussein and his confrontation with oppression, cannot cease its struggle against the Zionist regime and accept the oppression of this regime against the defenseless and oppressed people of Palestine. Furthermore, the belief in Shi’ism as a true Islam that passes through the path of Wilayat (Guardianship) cannot keep Iran silent in the face of “English Islam” and “American Islam.” Consequently, Tehran expects China, as Iran’s partner and companion, to consider Tehran’s ideological concerns, a behavior that has not yet been pursued in China’s foreign policy.
The United States Factor: The Tehran-Beijing relationship is more accurately considered a trilateral relationship rather than a bilateral one. Historical data analysis indicates that Washington’s influence on the expansion or reduction of Iran-China relations has been more significant than the desires of the nations themselves.
Arab Countries and the Zionist Regime: Although Arab countries cannot be considered a direct and serious obstacle in the current situation, their relations with China make Beijing’s policies in the region very cautious. Furthermore, these countries mostly hinder processes that could be effective in expanding Tehran-Beijing relations. The nuclear negotiations serve as a prime example. The Zionist regime is in a similar situation to Arab countries, with the difference that the Zionist regime, due to its position in US foreign policy, has a larger lobby, and Beijing also pays more attention to gaining its favor.
Sanctions Regime: The sanctions regime is one of the most significant obstacles to cooperation between the two countries. Oil and financial sanctions, which respectively complicate the transfer of Iranian oil and financial transactions resulting from economic activities, are the biggest impediments for Chinese and Iranian traders.
Opportunities Ahead
However, the most important opportunities for aligning the relations between the two countries can be categorized as follows:
Structural Conditions of the International System: It can easily be said that the world has moved away from the hierarchical period and the hegemonic order of the early years of the new millennium, which Washington sought to consolidate, and is undergoing a process of transitioning to a multipolar world. Nevertheless, some do not consider a future multipolar system valid, or at least, alongside it, refer to the emergence of a bipolar system as one of the imminent possibilities. Based on this, China itself is becoming a superpower alongside the United States. The impact of this process on Iran-China relations will be significant.
Functionalism and Economic Cooperation: Based on the logic of functionalism, benefiting from participation in past projects can encourage both parties to continue cooperation and extend it to other areas. Accordingly, it can be argued that this factor has been the most important reason for the convergence of the two countries in the years following the revolution, especially from Tehran’s perspective. Military cooperation during the Iran-Iraq War not only expanded cooperation in this field, making China the most important exporter of military equipment to Iran in subsequent years, but also provided opportunities for cooperation in economic sectors. Oil sales and the mutual economic benefits also led to cooperation in the transfer of certain technologies.
Energy Security: China’s increasing need for Middle Eastern energy is the most significant reason for its interest in the region. Tehran, with its rich oil and gas reserves, can supply China’s energy needs without US intervention. Iran holds the world’s third-largest oil reserves and second-largest gas reserves, which can make China self-sufficient in accessing vast energy resources.
Transit Importance: Achieving the advancement of the Belt and Road Initiative without considering Iran’s position might remain more of a dream. Due to its unique geographical location, Tehran is one of the most important countries for this initiative.
Tehran’s Reliability: The political and security rivalries between Tehran and Washington have allowed Beijing to place the most trust in Tehran among the capitals of the region. This is because most regional capitals have close ties with Washington, and Washington could, if needed, use them as leverage against China’s energy security.
Opportunity of the Sanctions Regime for China: The imposition of economic, financial, and other sanctions has created an untapped market in Iran for Chinese traders, a market from which their Western counterparts are deprived.
Conclusion
Despite their high importance for both sides, the cooperations between the two countries do not extend beyond the general foreign policy objectives of each. This realistic approach can free the minds of foreign policy decision-makers from confusion. It is clear that expecting China’s foreign policy in the Middle East to fully align with Iran’s interests is unrealistic. However, the two countries can increase their alignment by diversifying cooperation, institutionalizing relations in various dimensions, strengthening discursive convergence, overcoming some challenges, and managing others. In this scenario, China will become a strategic partner for Iran; not in the form of a “military alliance,” but as a multi-layered economic, geopolitical, and discursive partnership.